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Abstract 
This paper reports econometric estimation of brand level demand (AIDS) elasticities for regular 
carbonated soft drinks using Information Resources, Inc. panel data.  Own and cross price elasticities are 
used  to  measure  actual  and  hypothetical  market  power  that  would  arise  from  potential  mergers  or 
collusive pricing arrangements. Introduction 
Industrial  organization  economists  have  long  appreciated  the fact  that brand  level 
elasticities of demand have something to say about market power in differentiated product 
industries.  The  first  major  empirical  effort  in  this  area  were  the  papers  by  Baker and 
Bresnahan during  the  1980s  (Baker  and  Bresnahan  1985,  1987).  Baker  and  Bresnahan 
proposed  a  residual  demand  analysis  framework.  Within  that framework  they  estimated 
residual demand elasticities for particular products in a differentiated product industry (beer). 
They were thus  able  to  analyze  own  and cross  price  elasticities between  two  or three key 
products of  interest, in this case Anheuser-Busch, Coors and Pabst beer, to determine the impact 
of a hypothetical merger upon prices and profits. 
In this paper we propose to go beyond the residual demand framework to estimate the 
complete  set of brand  level  demand  own  and  cross  price  elasticities.  Using  Information 
Resources, Inc. (IRI) data for regular carbonated soft drinks for the period 1988 through 1990 
we are able to construct a balanced panel data set that allows us to estimate own and cross price 
elasticities for eight carbonated soft drink brands and private label soft drinks.  The demand 
framework that we  will  use is  the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS).  This framework is 
particularly useful for researchers with an industrial organization perspective because it uses as 
a dependent variable market share. The hypothesis within the demand framework is that there 
is a negative relationship between market share and price and this, in fact, measures a demand 
relationshipl. 
lConsiderable  prior research  on  the relationship  between  market share and  price  has 
reported that a positive share price relationship exists and that it is  evidence of the existence 
of market power.  For manufactured food products see Wills (1985).  Recent work by Cotterill 
and Haller (1994) resolves the apparent contradiction between these approaches explaining that 
the positive share price relationship is primarily an interfirm effect and that across local market 
and time for  a  particular brand the share price relationship  is  negative reflecting demand 
factors.  Also see Haller (1994) for supporting evidence from the catsup mdustry. 
1 The next section  of this  paper briefly presents the AIDS  model that is  used in the 
analysis.  The third section  discusses  the variables  used,  relevant econometric  issues,  and 
empirical results.  The fourth section, a discussion of related market power issues, is  followed 
(~  by conclusions. 
The AIDS Model and Description of Data 
The AIDS  was  developed by  Deaton and Muellbauer out of a  desire to increase the 
quality and ease of modeling consumer demand.  The AIDS  uses the following expenditure 
logc(u,p)  = (1  - u)loga(p) + ulogb(p),  (1)  function: 
where u and p represent utility and prices, respectively.  This expenditure function indirectly 
(via duality) represents a class of price-independent, generalized linear preferences (PIGLOG) 
which allow for exact aggregation over consumers.  Flexible functional forms are chosen for log 
a(p) and log b(P) such that the expenditure function can be written as 
Equation (2)  is  homogeneous of degree 1 in p, as theory requires, as long as 
Taking the logarithmic differentiation of  (2), applying Shepherd's lemma, and substituting for 
u in terms of p and expenditures (x) results in the following AIDS demand functions: 
Wi  =  (Ii  + L  yi}ogpj  +  ~ilog(xIP), 
j 
where Wi represents budget shares and log P equals 
2 
(3) (4) 
In most applications linearly approximated AIDS models (WAIDS) are used (e.g., Wessels and 
Wilen, 1992) in which the log of the price index is approximated by summing the products of 
budget shares and respective logged prices as represented by 
(5) 
The AIDS model conveniently allows for imposition of  restrictions; namely, adding-up, 
homogeneity, 
and symmetry, 
L  (Xi =  1,  L Y  ij =  0,  L  ~i =  0, 
i 
The adding-up restriction is guaranteed by construction of  the data, i.e. the sum of the 
budget shares of all the goods must equal one.  Homogeneity and symmetry can both be tested 
by  comparing  the  results  of the  restricted  model  with  that  of the  unrestricted  model. 
Restrictions  cannot be imposed  to  guarantee the remaining general restriction of demand 
equations, i.e. non  positivity of the substitution effect, but this can be checked by examining the 
eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix (Deaton and Muellbauer). 
The estimated coefficients on the price variables indicate the effect on budget shares 
(multiplied by 100) of  a one percent change in the price of  a given good, assuming (xlP) is held 
constant.  The effect of changes in real expenditures on 'budget shares is  indicated by the 
3 coefficient on (x/P).  A coefficient greater than zero implies a luxury good, whereas necessities 
are associated with a negative coefficient. 
Econometric Estimation and Empirical Results 
The demand for nine regular carbonated soft drink groups, namely Coca Cola, Pepsi, 
RC,  Sprite, 7  Up,  Dr.  Pepper, and Mountain Dew,  a  combined "All  Other" brand, and a 
combined private label brand is analyzed using the LNAIDS.  Data on prices, quantities sold, 
and some promotional activities were obtained through IRI.  IRI collects data by electronically 
recording the food  purchases of customers at several thousand supermarket stores across the 
nation over time.  The data is then averaged for a given geographic market.  Data used in this 
paper is  on a quarterly basis for the years 1988 through 1990 for 45 metropolitan areas.  IRI 
data is supplemented with relevant data (e.g. population, temperature) for these same marketing 
areas from other sources. 
In order to account for the panel structure of our data an error components or random 
effects model was used for econometric estimation Qudge, et al.  p. 475;  SHAZAM).  The error 
components approach used for the study allows the disturbance term to consist of  random and 
cross sectional components.  A plot of residuals over time suggested no clear pattern.  Hence, 
time binaries were not factored into the error components computations. The error components 
approach incorporates information from cross section binaries into the final parameter estimates 
but are not reported in the final regressions, thus economizing on variables and making the 
interpretation of regression results more manageable. 
Brand prices are endogenous variables in a differentiated product industry.  Therefore, 
a three-stage least squares estimation technique was used to reflect this endogeneity and to take 
advantage of information in the error variance-covariance matrix of the system of equations. 
4 A system of 17 equations are estimated in which the first eight equations are the AIDS share 
equations  and  the remaining nine  equations regress  brand  prices  on a  host of variables, 
including other brand prices.  An illustration of the system of equations is  provided in figure 
1.  Tables 1 and 2 provide a list of variables and descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
study. 
Coke,  Pepsi  and All  Other brands  dominate  the  budget shares  with  each  having 
approximately a quarter of total share. Dr. Pepper and Mountain Dew are at the high end of 
the price range, whereas Private Label, as  expected, and RC  are at the low end.  The larger 
share soft drinks are associated with  moderate prices.  Private label brands have noticeably 
higher  units  per volume  than other brands,  suggesting that they  market  primarily small 
containers (probably 12 ounce cans). 
The percent of  volume sold associated with Sunday newspaper feature ads ranges from 
6.44 percent (RC) to  13.95 percent (Mountain Dew).  A much greater percent of volume sold 
is  associated with supermarket aisle displays with a range between 29.6 percent (All  Other) to 
68.56 percent (Coke).  Coke and Pepsi apparently flex their marketing muscles in this form of 
promotional activity.  These two brands also dominate in terms of national advertising.  The 
leading nationally advertised brand was either Coke or Pepsi in each time period of the study. 
Temperature,  Supermarket  to  Grocery  Sales  ratio,  Market  CR4,  Sweetner,  and 
Population are all variables that do not vary by brand but generally vary by cross section and 
over time.  The captivity variables reflect whether the Coca eMa or Pepsi companies own the 
bottling company for  their brands in a given market.  Other than the Coca Cola and Pepsi 
brands this variable is only relevant for Sprite (Coca Cola Co.) and Mountain Dew (Pepsi Co.). 
The All  Other brand was  not included in the initial  estimation in order to avoid a 
singular matrix problem.  This problem occurs because of  the relationship between the adding-
5 up feature of  budget shares and the constant term. The coefficients for "All Other" are obtained 
after estimation by using the adding-up conditions. 
Regression results are presented in table 3.  Own price coefficients are significantly 
negative for  most brands.  Cross  price coefficients  are symmetric due to  the imposition of 
symmetry restrictions.  In the Coke equation we observe a positive cross price effect with Sprite. 
The  result  for  the  Sprite  brand,  owned  by  the  Coca  Cola  company,  may  be  due  to 
complementary  positioning  of this  brand vis  a  vis  the  Coke  brand.  This  complementary 
positioning does not occur in the case of Pepsi and Mountain Dew (both owned by PepsiCo, 
Inc.).  Positive cross price effects on Pepsi shares are found for all brands. 
Own and cross price elasticities are presented in table 4.  For each brand the own price 
elasticities are negative and significant.  Cross  price elasticities suggest the presence of both 
substitution and complementarity among soft drinks. 
Measuring Market Power 
The data found in table 4 is  a rich source of information for economic analysis.  For 
example, one can estimate the impact of market power and collusive pricing among firms by 
examining own and cross price elasticities.  Let us use 1988 data (IRI) for Coke as an example. 
At an average price of$3.73 Coca Cola sold 338.7 million 192-ounce units of  Coke nationwide. 
The Coca Cola company profit margin was 12.4 percent in 1988 (Tollison et al. p. 34).  Assuming 
that rate holds for the Coke brand profits in 1988 are $155.8 million.  This is  shown as areas 
A and B in figure 2a.  If Coke raises its price by ten percent to $4.10 the quantity demanded 
decreases, ceteris paribus,  by 14.96 percent (50.7 million units) as suggested by Coke's own price 
elasticity figure of -1.496.  Coke's profit is  now $239.0 million and appears as  areas A and C. 
In this case Coke exhibits power underneath its demand curve because higher prices lead to 
higher profits. 
6 If we  consider a hypothesized fully collusive pricing arrangement between Coke and 
Pepsi (each raise price 10 percent) we must now factor in the cross price elasticity between Coke 
and Pepsi which is  0.355.  The impact of the joint pricing arrangement will  decrease Coke's 
elasticity measure by the amount of the positive cross price elasticity, from -1.496 to -1.141.  A 
ten percent price increase will result in a quantity demanded of300.1 million units as compared 
to  288.0 million.  Coca Cola's demand curve becomes steeper and its profitability (area D in 
figure 2b) increases to $249.1 million as a result of the collusive arrangement. 
The Coke demand curve becomes steeper as  more Coke substitutes are included in the 
collusive pricing arrangement. If Coke colludes on price with all non-Coca Cola brands the net 
elasticity  for  Coke  is  -1.073.  A  ten  percent price  increase  results  in  302.4  million  units 
demanded and profitability of $251.0 million (area E in figure 2c). 
The change in profitability between collusive and noncollusive pricing arrangements is 
not as large as one might expect.  It  suggests that nearly all of  Coke's market power is unilateral 
and not coordinated market power. We should also note that the calculated profitability change 
is  only with respect to  Coke's profits and does not include the changes in the other brands' 
profits.  Tacit collusion may benefit less dominant brands more than Coke.  Finally, we continue 
to explore the sensitivity of our results to model specification. 
Table 5 indicates that many soft drink prices, especially Coke and Pepsi prices, are highly 
correlated.  These high correlations do not confirm the existence of collusive pricing but do 
suggest that the possibility exists and points to a need for further investigation. 
Conclusions 
IRI data and demand theory provide powerful insights into the marketing strategies of 
individual branded products.  One can estimate demand elasticities and use these to measure 
7 actual market power and hypothetical market power that would arise from particular mergers, 
collusive pricing or other marketing strategies. 
As  research  limitations,  such  as  availability  of brand  level  data  and  theoretical 
shortcomings,  are  reduced  greater insights  will  be  achieved.  Equipped  with  better tools 
industrial organization economists will better understand how markets work. 
8 Figure 1.  System of Demand and Price Equations, Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks 
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Table 1.  Description of  Variables and Related Notes 
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percent of __  brand's volume sold with feature advertising 
percent of __  brand's volume sold with displays and point of purchase promotions 
number of units of __  brand divided by the volume sold of __  brand 
__  brand's national TV advertising as a percent of the leader 
Temperature  mean temperature in local market for a given quarter 
SupMktlGrocSale  the percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by supermarkets 
MktCR4  percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by top 4 grocery chains 
Sweetner  price of most frequently used sweetner during study period (high fructose corn syrup) 
Population  population in local market 
Coke Captive  binary  variable  to  indicate  a  Coca  Cola  Co.-owned  bottler  for  the  local  market 
PepsiCaptive  binary variable to indicate a Pepsi Co.-owned bottler for the local market 
• The price index (p.) used is Stone's linear approximate price index, In p. = 2. Shrj  •  In Pi. 
10 Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
, 
Variable  Mean  St.Dev.  Variance  Min  Max  Variable  Mean  St.Dev.  Variance  Min  Max 
Share:  Displays: 
Coke  0.249  0.0831  0.0069  0.104  0.496  Coke  68.56  10.725  115.03  33.70  92.29 
Pepsi  0.244  0.0616  0.0038  0.089  0.386  Pepsi  68.43  10.238  104.81  32.27  91.95 
RC  0.020  0.0148  0.0002  0.001  0.085  RC  44.86  20.404  416.32  0.00  88.42 
Sprite  0.040  0.0138  0.0002  0.015  0.095  Sprite  54.61  14.141  199.97  12.64  89.75 
7-Up  0.052  0.0248  0.0006  0.015  0.141  7-Up  46.55  15.084  227.54  4.58  80.63 
DrPep  0.038  0.0349  0.0012  0.003  0.217  DrPep  37.64  20.429  417.36  0.00  85.23 
MtDew  0.031  0.0233  0.0005  0.005  0.111  MtDew  39.44  21.422  458.88  0.10  85.15 
PrivLab  0.076  0.0464  0.0022  0.002  0.264  PrivLab  29.80  14.079  198.21  1.09  68.57 
AllOthr  0.250  0.0702  0.0049  0.107  0.450  AlIOthr  29.63  9.459  89.47  9.48  56.54 
Relative National 
Price:  Advertising: 
Coke  3.72  0.3072  0.0943  2.80  4.93  Coke  0.897  0.1515  0.0229  0.557  l.OCO 
Pepsi  3.66  0.3826  0.1464  2.67  5.46  Pepsi  0.843  0.1962  0.0385  0.486  l.OCO 
RC  3.30  0.4187  0.1753  2.25  5.14  RC  0.046  0.0426  0.0018  0.003  0.119 
Sprite  3.63  0.3130  0.0980  2.79  4.92  Sprite  0.314  0.1488  0.0221  0.028  0.505 
7-Up  3.79  0.3593  0.1291  2.85  5.05  7-Up  0.298  0.1644  0.0270  0.095  0.567 
DrPep  3.99  0.4245  0.1802  2.85  5.36  DrPep  0.252  0.1348  0.0182  0.013  0.481 
MtDew  3.93  0.4210  0.1773  2.86  5.32  MtDew  0.071  0.0536  0.0029  0.001  0.185 
PrivLab  2.34  0.2516  0.0633  1.66  3.19  PrivLab 
AllOthr  3.60  0.4019  0.1615  2.10  5.01  AllOthr  0.015  0.0075  0.0001  0.006  0.032 
Feature Ads:  Units per Volume: 
Coke  6.99  4.999  24.987  0.26  31.84  Coke  2.26  0.330  0.1090  1.16  2.84 
Pepsi  7.30  5.278  27.862  0.34  40.47  Pepsi  2.25  0.333  0.1107  1.10  2.87 
RC  6.44  6.792  46.133  0.00  38.31  RC  2.47  0.363  0.1321  1.29  3.78 
Sprite  12.08  7.253  52.606  0.61  44.23  Sprite  2.35  0.275  0.0756  1.43  3.35 
7-Up  7.37  5.981  35.768  0.00  29.54  7-Up  2.52  0.250  0.0627  1.49  3.28 
DrPep  8.48  7.476  55.897  0.00  41.98  DrPep  2.36  0.289  0.0838  1.27  2.82 
MtDew  13.95  9.157  83.847  0.00  60.82  MtDew  2.28  0.342  0.1171  1.09  2.85 
PrivLab  11.98  9.018  81.324  0.00  55.30  PrivLab  5.70  2.142  4.5894  2.73  13.24 
AllOthr  12.63  6.395  40.894  0.91  42.48  AllOthr  3.61  0.836  0.6995  2.17  7.10 
ExpenditureX  4.45  0.928  0.862  2.48  7.57  Sweetner:  20.73  3.092  9.56  14.40  25.50 
Temperature:  58.09  15.605  243.52  18.80  91.64  Population:  3.1E+6  2.9E+6  8.4E+ 12  6.8E+5  1.6E+7 
SpMkt/GrcSale:  77 .17  5.977  35.72  64.50  95.30  CokeCaptive:  0.437  0.496  0.246  0.0  1.0 
Market CR4:  62.86  13.580  184.41  23.90  88.10  PepsiCaptive:  0.522  0.500  0.250  0.0  1.0 
11 Table 3.  Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) Estimation Results: Error Components Model (3SLS) with 
Homogeneity and Symmetry Restrictions. 
Coke  Pepsi  RC  Sprite  7Up  DrPep  MtDew  PrivLab  AlIOthr 
Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share  Share . 
RHS 
Coke  -0.1189  0.0928  0.0161  -0.0218  0.0203  -0.0015  -0.0048  0.0092  0.0085 
Price  (-4.551),  (4.553)'  (1.864)C  (-2.645)"  (2.018)b  (-0.176)  (-0.587)  (0.976) 
Pepsi  0.0928  -0.2053  0.0028  0.0137  0.0306  0.0259  0.0195  0.0015  0.0186 
Price  (4.553)'  (-7.789)'  (0.330)  (1.826)C  (3.111)'  (2.978)'  (1.859)C  (0.170) 
. 
RC  0.0161  0.0028  -0.0308  0.0038  0.0089  -0.0028  0.0077  -0.0161  0.0105 
Price  (1.864),  (0.330)  (-4.924),  (0.949)  (1.767)C  (-0.608)  (1.846),  (-4.579)" 
Sprite  -0.0218  0.0137  0.0038  -0.0098  0.0021  -0.0005  0.0019  0.0061  0.0046 
Price  (-2.645)'  (1.826)C  (0.949)  (-1.230)'  (0.462)  (-0.127)  (0.371)  (2.311)b 
7Up  0.0203  0.0306  0.0089  0.0021  -0.0465  -0.0012  -0.0046  -0.0107  0.0013 
Price  (2.018)b  (3.111),  (1.767),  (0.462)  (-4.282)'  (-0.245)  (-1.028)  (-2.578)' 
DrPep  -0.0015  0.0259  -0.0028  -0.0005  -0.0012  -0.0173  -0.0119  0.0049  0.0045 
Price  (-0.176)  (2.978)'  (-0.608)  (-0.127)  (-0.245)  (-2.030)b  (-2.370)b  (1.611) 
MtDew  -0.0048  0.0195  0.0077  0.0019  -0.0046  -0.0119  -0.0093  0.0060  -0.0045 
Price  (-0.587)  (1.859)C  (1.846)C  (0.371)  (-1.028)  (-2.370)b  (-0.773)  (2.418)b 
PrivLab  0.0092  0.0015  -0.0161  0.0061  -0.0107  0.0049  0.0060  0.0053  -0.0061 
Price  (0.976)  (0.170)  (-4.579)'  (2.311)b  (-2.578)'  (1.611)  (2.418)b  (0.525) 
AlIOthr  0.0085  0.0186  0.0105  0.0046  0.0013  0.0045  -0.0045  -0.0061  -0.0375 
Price  (0.764)  (1.813)'  (2.884),  (1.594)  (0.302)  (1.479)  (-1.778)'  (-0.659) 
Expend  0.0181  0.0266  -0.0094  0.0011  -0.0108  -0.0010  0.0043  -0.0132  -0.0157 
index  (2.738)'  (4.418)'  (-4.793)'  (0.708)  (-4.460)'  (-0.558)  (2.864)'  (-2.659)' 
Feature  0.0006  0.0005  0.0002  0.3E-04  0.0002  0.0001  0.7E-05  0.0002 
(1.846)'  (1.912)'  (3.717)'  (0.810)  (1.975)b  (1.286)  (0.160)  (2.266)b 
_Display  0.0010  0.0007  0.0001  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0005 
(5.880)'  (4.472)'  (6.442)'  (9.854)'  (3.296)'  (7.187)'  (5.836)'  (6.658)' 
RelTVAd  0.0223  0.0020  -0.0110  0.0041  -0.0062  0.0096  -0.0108 
(3.920)'  (0.611)  (-1.646),  (3.318),  (-3.898)'  (6.186)'  (-3.256)" 
MeanTemp  -0.0004  -0.0005  0.9E-05  0.6E-05  -0.0002  -0.5E-04  0.4E-04  0.0002 
(-6.575)'  (-8.146)'  (0.382)  (0.394)  (-7.468)'  (-2.603)'  (2.424)b  (4.895)' 
Gonstant  0.1847  0.2039  0.0066  0.0243  0.0586  0.0343  0.0259  0.0511 
(11.33)"  (12.88)'  (2.263)b  (8.052)'  (13.46)'  (7.124)'  (6.752),  (6.687)' 
, = significant at the .01  level 
b = significant at the .05 level 
C  = significant at the .10 level 
'Coefficients for All Other category were obtained by using the adding-up condition of the AIDS model. 
12 Table 4,  Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinksl 
Coke  Pepsi 
Coke  -1.496
0 0  0.355" 
Pepsi  0.353"  -1.868
00 
RC  0.909
0  0.251 
Sprite  -0.555
00  0.338+ 
7Up  0.440
0  0.637" 
DrPep  -0.032  0.685·· 
MtDew  -0.186  0.598+ 
PrivLab  0.163  0.062 
AlIOther  0.050  0.090· 
IElasticities are read from left to riglJt; 
••  =  1 % significance level 
•  =  5 % significance level 
+  =  10 % significance level 
RC  Sprite  7Up 
0.063+  -0.090
00  0.078+ 
0.009  0.052+  0.120
00 
-2.508"  0.205  0.457+ 
0.095  -1.248"  0.051 
0.172+  0.048  -1.881" 
-0.073  -0.013  -0.030 
0.247+  0.056  -0.158 
-0.207··  0.086·  -0.132· 
0.044··  0.021 +  0.009 
c' 
DrPep  MtDew  PrivLab  AllOther 
-0.009  -0.021  0.031  0.016 
0.102
00  0.076+  -0.002  0.049 
-0.121  0.394+  -0.758
00  0.636" 
-0.015  0.047  0.151
0  0.108 
-0.015  -0.083  -0.190·  0.077 
-1.453"  -0.313·  0.131  0.125 
-0.393·  -1.307
0
•  0.183·  -0.179· 
0.071 +  0.083"  -0.918··  -0.037 
0.020+  -0.016  -0.020  -1.134" 
2t statistics for "All Other" are approxjmated in that covariances between expenditure and price coefficients are not accounted for in calculating standard 
errors of  the elasticities.  These approximations are reasonable because the covariances between expenditure and price coefficients for the other brands 
are quite small (the significance levels in these other equations do not change if these covariances are excluded in the calculation of  the standard errors 
of the ela~ticities).  . 
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Figure 2.  Coke profitability under different coluslve arrangements 
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Q Table 5.  Correlation Matrix of Regular Carbonated Soft Drink Prices,  1988· 1990 
Coke  1.000 
Pepsi  0.815  1.000 
RC  0.437  0.458  1.000 
Sprite  0.794  0.652  0.364  1.000 
7.Up  0.694  0.663  0.482  0.689  1.000 
DrPep  0.626  0.681  0.624  0.579  0.670  1.000 
MtDew  0.726  0.890  0.460  0.642  0.644  0.712  1.000 
PrivLab  0.047  0.124  0.288  0.058  0.052  0.088  0.126  1.000 
AllOthr  0.659  0.657  0.538  0.575  0.590  0.609  0.608  0.209  1.0000 
Coke  Pepsi  RC  Sprite  7.Up  DrPep  MtDew PrivLab  AllOthr 
15 • 
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